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ABSTRACT 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: We attempt to clarify the relationships between firm profitability, 
state ownership, and top management turnover at partially privatized firms by taking the 
behavioral theory of organizational search, which proposes that firms focus on target in 
performance evaluation.   
Research Findings/Insights: Using data from a large sample of the listed firms in China from 
1999 to 2002, we find that firm profitability and state ownership are negatively related to top 
management turnover only when firm profitability is below target (measured by industry 
median). We also find that top management turnover has a positive impact on subsequent firm 
profitability when it occurs under performance below target, but has a negative impact when it 
occurs under performance above target. Lastly, we find that top management turnover under low 
performance has a positive impact on subsequent firm profitability when the state is not the 
largest shareholder, but has no impact when the state is the largest shareholder.  
Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our study provides strong support for the argument that 
state ownership weakens corporate governance quality in partial privatization. It also 
demonstrates the contribution of the behavioral theory of organizational search to the study of 
top management turnover in emerging economies where it is difficult to identify forced turnover.  
Practitioner/Policy Implications: To further improve the economic performance of partially 
privatized firms, states should continue to dilute their ownership. In addition, firms should 
carefully manage top management turnover when performance is above target. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Top Management Turnover; Privatization; Organizational 
search
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INTRODUCTION 
Many countries, especially the emerging economies in Asia, Eastern Europe, and South 
America, have started to privatize state-owned enterprises (SOEs) since the 1980s. Empirical 
research consistently shows that privatization, including partial privatization, has a positive 
impact on firm profitability (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Djankov and Murrell, 2002). Recent 
studies also find that state ownership has a negative impact on firm profitability at partially 
privatized firms in China and India (Sun and Tong, 2003; Gupta, 2005; Wei et al, 2005). One 
explanation for these findings is that privatization improves corporate governance quality in that 
private owners make managers more accountable for firm profitability than government 
bureaucrats (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Megginson, 2005).  
In contrast to the numerous studies of the performance impact of privatization, little 
research directly investigates whether state ownership actually weakens the relationship between 
firm profitability and the turnover of top managers (namely, CEOs and/or board chairs) in 
emerging economies. Only recently have some researchers examined this issue using data from 
the listed firms in China (Firth et al, 2006; Kato and Long, 2006a, 2006b). Because of the 
difficulty in identifying forced turnover attributable to corporate governance in emerging 
economies (Gibson, 2003), these authors generally include all top management turnover in the 
analysis. Overall, they find that firm profitability is negatively related to top management 
turnover, suggesting that top managers are held accountable for firm profitability. However, there 
is no convincing evidence that state ownership weakens the negative relationship between firm 
profitability and top management turnover. This finding raises the question of whether state 
ownership in China truly weakens corporate governance quality by making managers less 
accountable for firm profitability. Further, there is no strong evidence that top management 
turnover has a positive impact on subsequent firm profitability, raising question about the 
effectiveness of corporate governance at the listed firms in China.  
Our study attempts to clarify the relationships between firm profitability, state ownership, 
and top management turnover by taking the behavioral theory of organizational search developed 
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by March and colleagues (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963). The behavioral 
theory of organizational search proposes that firms focus on target in performance evaluation. 
When performance meets target, firms regard it as satisfactory. In this situation, firms tend to 
maintain current routines and have limited motivation to search for alternatives. When 
performance misses target, firms regard it as unsatisfactory. In this situation, firms actively 
search for alternatives to enhance their prospect of returning performance above target. This 
behavioral theory of organizational search has received empirical support from research on 
organizational change (Lant et al., 1992; Greve, 1998), strategic alliances (Baum et al., 2005), 
and R&D intensity (Greve, 2003a; Chen and Miller, 2007; Chen, 2008). 
Applying the behavioral theory of organizational search to corporate governance, we 
propose that owners of firms seek to discipline top managers only when performance drops 
below target. When performance is above target, top management turnover should not be 
considered as outcome of corporate governance because owners of firms are satisfied with 
performance and thus have no incentive to replace top managers. This proposition suggests that 
to understand the relationships between firm profitability, state ownership, and top management 
turnover following partial privatization, it is important to separate top management turnovers 
occurred at firms where profitability is below target from those occurred at firms where 
profitability is above target.  
We test the above proposition using data from the listed firms in China from 1999 to 
2002. We measure firm profitability with both returns on assets (ROA) and earnings per share 
(EPS). Following recent research on the behavioral theory of organizational search (Greve, 
2003b; Baum et al., 2005; Chen and Miller, 2007; Chen, 2008), we use industry median 
profitability as the proxy of performance target. We find that firm profitability and state 
ownership are negatively related to top management turnover when firm profitability is below 
industry median, but not when profitability is above industry median. We also find that top 
management turnover under unsatisfactory performance (i.e., below industry median) has a 
positive impact on subsequent firm profitability only when the state is not the largest shareholder 
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of the firm. Lastly, we find that top management turnover under satisfactory performance (i.e., 
above industry median) has a negative impact on subsequent firm profitability.  
Our study contributes to the literature on corporate governance in emerging economies in 
two important ways. First, it clarifies the role of state ownership in the relationship between firm 
profitability and top management turnover, and provides convincing evidence that state 
ownership weakens corporate governance quality by making top managers less accountable for 
firm profitability at the listed firms in China. Second, it demonstrates that the behavioral theory 
of organizational search can be very useful to the study of top management turnover in emerging 
economies, where it is often difficult to identify the true reasons behind top management 
turnover because of the lack of relevant information. Our study also contributes to research on 
the behavioral theory of organizational search by extending it to the study of corporate 
governance and top management turnover. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Privatization, Corporate Governance and Top Management Turnover 
Empirical studies of privatization consistently show that state ownership is associated 
with lower firm financial performance than is private ownership in both developed and emerging 
economies (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Djankov and Murrell, 2002). Recent studies about 
partial privatization in China and India also show that state ownership has a negative impact on 
financial performance at partially privatized firms (Sun and Tong, 2003; Gupta, 2005; Wei et al, 
2005). One explanation for these findings focuses on the difference in corporate governance 
between representatives of state ownership (i.e., government bureaucrats) and private owners 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Megginson, 2005). Although private owners pursue profit 
maximization, the main goal for government bureaucrats is to achieve their social and political 
objectives that are often different from profit maximization. Even if some government 
bureaucrats are interested in profit maximization, they tend to have weak incentive to invest the 
time and effort required to monitor managerial performance. The reason is that the cost involved 
 4 
is much higher than the political payoff of modestly improving firm profitability. Thus, 
according to this perspective, the positive impact of privatization on firm profitability results 
from improvement in corporate governance quality, which refers to the degree to which 
managers are held accountable for firm profitability (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Megginson, 
2005). Private owners introduced by privatization make managers more accountable for firm 
profitability than do government bureaucrats.   
One way to assess corporate governance quality directly is to examine the relationship 
between firm profitability and top management turnover. Because a main purpose of corporate 
governance is to ensure that shareholder interests are protected and low performing managers are 
terminated, an important function of corporate governance is to identify and terminate low 
quality managers (Weisbach, 1988; Gibson, 2003). Because firm performance is often considered 
as an indicator of the quality of top managers, prior research consistently finds that firm 
performance is negatively related to top management turnover (Finkelstein et al., in press). 
Moreover, because good corporate governance also means replacing low quality managers with 
high quality successors, top management turnover due to corporate governance is expected, and 
has been found, to have a positive impact on subsequent firm performance (Denis and Denis, 
1995; Huson et al., 2004).  
If the positive impact of privatization on firm profitability results from improvement in 
corporate governance quality, we should expect firm profitability to be negatively related to top 
management turnover after privatization, which in turn has a positive impact on subsequent firm 
profitability. Moreover, if the privatization is partial and the state still pressure managers to 
pursue goals other than profit maximization, we should observe that state ownership weakens the 
relationship between firm profitability and top management turnover.  
In contrast to the numerous studies of the performance impact of privatization, little 
research directly investigates whether top managers are held accountable for firm profitability 
after privatization, and whether state ownership in partial privatization weakens the relationship 
between firm profitability and top management turnover. Only recently have some researchers 
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examined these issues using data from the listed firms in China (e.g., Firth et al, 2006; Kato and 
Long, 2006a, 2006b).   
Partial Privatization and Top Management Turnover in China 
Since the initiation of SOE reform in 1979, China has engaged in the transition to a 
market-oriented economy, with the intent to increase enterprise autonomy and efficiency. In 1990 
China first listed 10 former SOEs through share-issue privatization (SIP). By the end of 2002, 
the number of listed firms in China’s Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) skyrocketed to 1224, with a total market capitalization of RMB 3.86 trillion 
(about US $470 billion), equivalent to nearly 37% of China’s GDP (Zhang, 2004). Most of the 
listed firms are partially privatized former SOEs. The state, represented by central and regional 
government agencies, retains about one third of all the shares issued and is the largest 
shareholder in more than 40% of the listed firms (Zhang, 2004). Overall, SIP in China improves 
SOEs’ earnings ability, real sales, and worker productivity (Sun and Tong, 2003). There is also 
evidence that state ownership at the listed firms have a negative impact on firm performance 
(Sun and Tong, 2003; Wei et al., 2005). These findings are consistent with prior studies on the 
performance impact of privatization in other countries (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Djankov 
and Murrell, 2002; Gupta, 2005).  
Recent studies also find that firm profitability is negatively related to top management 
turnover at the listed firms in China. However, there is no convincing evidence that state 
ownership weakens this relationship. Although Kato and Long (2006a) report that the negative 
relationship between firm profitability and top management turnover is weaker for firms still 
controlled by the state, Firth et al. (2006) find that state ownership and its interaction with firm 
profitability are not significantly related to top management turnover. Nor is there strong 
evidence that top management turnover has a positive impact on subsequent firm profitability. 
Kato and Long (2006b) find only weak evidence that top management turnover leads to an 
increase in firm ROA. Firth et al. (2006) find no evidence that firm profitability improves 
following top management turnover. These findings raise the question of whether privatization 
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truly improves the quality and effectiveness of corporate governance in the world’s largest 
emerging economy, China. 
Two related issues may help explain the lack of strong support for the argument that 
privatization improves corporate governance quality and effectiveness in China. One is the 
difficulty to identify top management turnover attributable to corporate governance. Prior 
research stresses the importance of separating forced turnover from voluntary turnover in 
studying the relationship between firm profitability and top management turnover because only 
forced turnover reflects the quality of corporate governance (Huson et al., 2004). However, it is 
often difficult to identify forced top management turnover in emerging economies because of the 
lack of information (Gibson, 2003). In China, the task is even more challenging due to several 
factors. The first is the high rate of top management turnover, which is about 24% for CEOs 
(Kato and Long, 2006a) and 40% for board chairs (Firth et al., 2006). The second is the relative 
young age of top managers when they step down, which is about 50 years old for CEOs and 51 
years old for board chairs. Unlike in developed economies such as the U.S. where CEOs 
normally retire after stepping down
1
, serving as the CEO or board chair of a listed firm is usually 
not the final stage of one’s career in China. Instead, many top managers aspire to obtain a higher 
position in the government or in the controlling shareholder after stepping down from office 
(Tenev and Zhang, 2002). 
Lastly, there is lack of transparency about the true reasons of top management turnover in 
China because of a strong culture emphasizing harmony and saving face in interpersonal and 
social relationships (Firth et al., 2006). In studying CEO turnovers at U.S. companies, 
researchers can usually rely on the age of the outgoing CEOs and news reports to separate forced 
turnover from ordinary retirement (Shen and Cannella, 2002; Huson et al., 2004). However, 
because of the factors pointed out above, it is extremely difficult to identify forced top 
management turnover in China. Although Firth et al. (2006) take great effort to separate forced 
and normal turnover on the basis of the reasons given by the firms, their results show that firm 
performance has a negative impact on both forced and normal turnover, suggesting that what 
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they classified as normal turnover is not all “normal”2. Because of the difficulty to identify 
forced turnover, Firth et al. (2006) and Kato and Long (2006a, 2006b) include all turnover in 
their analysis of the relationships between firm profitability, state ownership, and top 
management turnover.  
The other issue directs at the assessment of firm performance. Conceptually, it is poor 
firm performance that triggers forced top management turnover attributable to corporate 
governance (Weisbach, 1988). Empirically, prior research focuses on the main effect of firm 
profitability on top management turnover and the moderating effects of corporate governance 
mechanisms such as ownership structure and the board of directors on the sensitivity of top 
management turnover to firm profitability (Finkelstein et al., in press). The underlying 
assumption is that firm profitability has a constant negative impact on top management turnover 
when corporate governance is effective. In other words, because the goal of the firm is to 
maximize profits, top managers at firms with lower profitability always face a higher risk of 
forced turnover than top managers at firms with higher profitability.  
When forced top management turnover can be successfully identified, this approach has 
shown to work well. However, when forced top management turnover cannot be clearly 
identified and when the rate of top management turnover is high, as in the context of China, this 
approach may not be adequate in assessing the quality of corporate governance. The reason is 
that the large number of top management turnover unrelated to corporate governance 
significantly limit researchers’ ability to detect the impact of forced top management turnover on 
subsequent firm performance as well as how state ownership affects the relationship between 
firm performance and forced top management turnover.    
A Behavioral Perspective of Top Management Turnover  
We believe that the behavioral theory of organizational search can help solve the above 
issues and clarify the relationships between firm profitability, state ownership, and top 
management turnover. Unlike classic economic theories that assume the goal of the firm is to 
maximize profits, the behavioral theory of organizational search proposes that firms use 
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satisficing as a rule in decision making (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963). 
According to this theory, because organizational search consumes resources and involves risk, its 
intensity changes in response to the feedback from a comparison between performance and target. 
When performance meets target, firms consider it satisfactory. In this situation, firms tend to 
maintain current routines and have limited motivation to search for new things. When 
performance misses target, firms consider it as a failure and start to seek alternatives to enhance 
their prospect of returning performance to the target level. Empirical studies have provided 
strong support for the behavioral theory of organizational search, showing that firms tend to 
make decisions of organizational change (Lant et al., 1992; Greve, 1998), strategic alliances 
(Baum et al., 2005), and R&D intensity (Greve, 2003a; Chen and Miller, 2007; Chen, 2008) on 
the basis of performance assessment relative to targets.  
We propose that the behavioral theory of organizational search can also be applied to the 
decision of forced top management turnover in corporate governance. Forced top management 
turnover represents an important organizational change, in which the firm attempts to replace 
low quality top managers with high quality successors (Huson et al., 2004). Although prior 
research shows that firm performance has a negative relationship with top management turnover 
(Finkelstein et al., in press), the behavioral theory of organizational search suggests that owners 
of firms are most likely to dismiss their top managers when performance misses target. When 
performance meets target, owners will consider it satisfactory and are unlikely to dismiss top 
managers. Top management turnover thus should not be considered as forced or the outcome of 
corporate governance when it occurs under satisfactory performance. To accurately assess the 
quality of corporate governance, we propose that it is important to separate top management 
turnover on the basis of whether firm performance is above or below target.  
To apply and test the above behavioral theory-based proposition of top management 
turnover, the key is to identify the performance target. Scholars have proposed two sources of 
firm performance target. One is the firm’s past performance, and the other is the performance of 
similar others (March & Simon, 1958; Cyert & March, 1963). In their seminal book, March and 
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Simon (1958) propose that organizations, like individuals, adjust their goals to the level of past 
achievement. This proposition suggests that past performance serves as a main source of 
performance target. In addition, drawing from social comparison theory at the individual level 
(Festinger, 1954), Cyert and March (1963) propose that a firm’s performance target is also 
influenced by the performance of competitors or other comparable organizations. Empirical 
research following the behavioral theory of organizational search has confirmed that firms in 
developed economies such as U.S. and Japan tend to use their own past performance and the 
performance of peer firms to form performance targets (e.g., Lant et al., 1992; Greve, 1998, 
2003a; Baum et al., 2005; Chen and Miller, 2007; Chen, 2008).  
In emerging economies such as China, firms may not rely on past performance to form 
performance target because of the rapid changes and uncertainties they face. Many emerging 
economies are in the process of transition into a market economy, which is characterized by 
constant changes in government regulations and competition (Hoskisson et al., 2000). In such a 
dynamic and uncertain environment, past performance is hardly a good predictor of future 
performance. Moreover, what is considered as satisfactory performance in the past may not be an 
appropriate target in assessing current performance. Because of these concerns, firms operating 
in a dynamic environment tend to use their peers’ performance as the benchmark in the 
assessment of their own performance (March, 1994). We thus propose that firms in emerging 
economies use the performance of peer firms as the target to assess the performance of their top 
managers.  
Because some firms aspire to become industry leaders, it would be ideal to survey 
owners and top managers about which firms they consider as peers. However, due to practical 
concerns, this information is extremely difficult to obtain. Prior research primarily treats all the 
other firms in the same industry as peers of the focal firm and use industry mean or median 
performance measures as proxies of peer performance-based target (Greve, 2003b). We thus 
decide to use the industry median profitability as the performance target in developing testable 
hypotheses from the behavioral perspective of organizational search.  
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To better illustrate our proposed relationships between firm profitability, state ownership, 
and top management turnover, we provide a graphical summary of the main hypotheses in Figure 
1. Figure 1A summarizes the hypothesized relationships when firm profitability is below the 
industry median, and Figure 1b summarizes the hypothesized relationships when firm 
profitability is above the industry median.  
__________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
__________________________   
When performance is below the industry median, owners of the firms will become 
dissatisfied. The further firm profitability drops below the industry median, the more dissatisfied 
owners will become and the more likely they will initiate a change in top management. In 
contrast, when performance is above the industry median, owners of the firms tend to be satisfied. 
In this situation, they are unlikely to blame and replace top managers. If there is top management 
turnover under performance above the industry median, it is likely unrelated to performance. 
Therefore, building on the behavior theory of organizational search, we propose the following 
hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1a: When firm profitability is below the industry median, it is negatively related to 
top management turnover. 
Hypothesis 1b: When firm profitability is above the industry median, it is not related to top 
management turnover. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that increase in firm profitability following 
privatization can be attributed to improvement in corporate governance quality provided by 
private owners. Although the Chinese government intends to establish a modern corporate 
system, it is unclear whether state ownership in the listed firms functions to hold managers 
accountable for firm profitability. Unlike the abrupt changes in Russia and Eastern Europe, the 
economic reform in China has proceeded in a much controlled manner with the intention to 
maintain social and political stability. In fact, the Chinese government has consistently given 
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social and political stability the highest priority in the course of economic reform. Thus, it will 
not be surprising if the state continues to pursue social and political objectives at the listed firms. 
Two recent studies (Sun and Tong, 2003; Wei et al., 2005) find that state ownership is negatively 
related to economic performance at the listed firms in China. Another study (Chen et al., 2008) 
finds that a change in the largest shareholder at the listed firms in China has a positive effect on 
firm profitability when control is passed from a state entity to a private entity, but has no effect 
when control is passed from one state entity to another state entity. These findings suggest that 
state ownership likely weakens the sensitivity of top management turnover to firm profitability. 
However, the empirical evidence about the impact of state ownership on top management 
turnover is not consistent. Although Kato and Long (2006a) find that the sensitivity of top 
management turnover to firm performance is weaker for the listed firms controlled by the state, 
Firth et al. (2006) report that neither state ownership nor its interaction with firm performance is 
significantly related to top management turnover at the listed firms in China. Our behavioral 
perspective suggests that state ownership weakens corporate governance quality only when firm 
profitability is below the industry median. When profitability is below the industry median, 
private owners will consider replacing top managers. However, because the state has social and 
political objectives other than maximizing profits, it may object the effort by private owners. 
Thus, we expect state ownership to have a negative impact on top management turnover. In 
contrast, when firm profitability is above the industry median, because replacing top managers 
due to poor performance is not an issue, we do not expect state ownership to have a significant 
impact on top management turnover. 
 Hypothesis 2a: When firm profitability is below the industry median, state ownership is 
negatively related to top management turnover. 
Hypothesis 2b: When firm profitability is above the industry median, state ownership is not 
related to top management turnover.  
In addition to studying the sensitivity of top management turnover to firm profitability, 
another approach in assessing corporate governance quality is to investigate the impact of top 
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management turnover on subsequent firm profitability. Because effective corporate governance 
means replacing a poor-performing manager with a more competent successor whose expected 
quality exceeds that of the predecessor (Huson et al., 2004), top management turnover due to 
poor performance should lead to a better replacement and thus have a positive impact on 
subsequent performance. However, Firth et al. (2006) and Kato and Long (2006b) do not find 
convincing evidence that top management turnover leads to an increase in performance at the 
listed firms in China. Again, given the high rate of top management turnover in China, we 
believe that it is important to separate turnover on the basis of performance relative to the target 
in examining the impact of top management turnover on subsequent firm performance. Only 
turnover under performance below the target reflects effort by owners to discipline management 
and thus has a positive impact on subsequent performance. When top management turnover 
occurs under performance above the target, it is unrelated to corporate governance and thus will 
not have a positive impact on subsequent performance. Instead, if the outgoing top manager 
leaves the firm for a better position because of his or her competence, the firm may not be able to 
find an equally competent successor. In this situation, top management turnover can actually 
have a negative impact on firm profitability.  
Hypothesis 3a: When firm profitability is below the industry median, top management turnover 
has a positive impact on subsequent firm profitability.  
Hypothesis 3b: When firm profitability is above the industry median, top management turnover 
has a negative impact on subsequent firm profitability. 
Our earlier literature review suggests that the state is not as concerned with firm 
profitability as private owners in the assessment of managerial performance. Given the high rate 
of top management turnover at the listed firms in China, it is possible that top management 
turnover coincides with low profitability at some firms that are controlled by the state. When this 
happens, it does not mean that these firms replace their top managers because of low profitability 
or the desire to turn performance around. Instead, it is just a coincidence. In this situation, top 
management turnover will have no impact on subsequent firm profitability. The positive impact 
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of top management turnover on firm profitability proposed in Hypothesis 3a will likely occur 
only at firms that are not controlled by the state. Because the largest shareholder usually exerts 
the strongest influence over the appointment of top managers in China (Firth et al., 2006), we 
propose the following hypotheses to refine the relationship proposed in Hypothesis 3a. 
Hypothesis 4a: When firm profitability is below the industry median, top management turnover 
has a positive impact on subsequent firm profitability if the state is not the 
largest shareholder. 
Hypothesis 4b: When firm profitability is below the industry median, top management turnover 
has no impact on subsequent firm profitability if the state is the largest 
shareholder.   
METHODS 
Sample 
Our sample consists of 1,203 firms listed in China’s SHSE and SZSE during 1999 to 
2002. Most of the firms are partially privatized former SOEs, and 821 firms were listed prior to 
1999. Our dataset is an unbalanced panel that consists of a total of 4,343 firm-year observations. 
All the data are obtained from the Chinese Stock Market and Accounting Research database 
(CSMAR), which is compiled using information from the listed firms’ annual and semi-annual 
reports. The CSMAR database is regarded as an authoritative data source of the listed firms in 
China. The fact that Kato and Long (2006a, 2006b) use the same database makes our results 
directly comparable with theirs. 
Measures 
Top management turnover. Prior research on top management turnover primarily focuses 
on the CEO, who is often considered the top executive of the company, particularly in the U.S. 
where about 80% of the CEOs also hold the title of board chair (Finkelstein et al., in press). In 
China the situation is more complicated. Traditionally, Chinese firms use the titles of General 
Manager (GM) or President to designate top managers. Only recently some firms start to adopt 
the title of CEO. For the purpose of simplicity, we treat GMs and Presidents as equivalents of 
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CEOs. However, individuals holding these titles are not necessarily top managers at the listed 
firms. Unlike in the U.S., CEO duality is far less common at the listed firms in China. In our 
sample, about 80% of the firms have separate CEOs and board chairs. Moreover, many board 
chairs work full time and receive the highest pay from their company. In essence, these board 
chairs are the actual top managers (Kato and long, 2006a).  
Given this complexity, we take the following approach to identify top managers. When 
the CEO is also the board chair, we treat him or her as the top manager of the firm. When the 
CEO is not the board chair, we treat the CEO as the top manager if the board chair is not a 
full-time employee or does not receive the highest pay from the firm. Otherwise, we treat the 
board chair as the top manager. Our approach is similar to Kato and Long (2006a, 2006b), but 
different from Firth et al. (2006) who treat all board chairs as the top manager. We measure top 
management turnover as a dummy variable, coded 1 if there was a top manager turnover during 
the year at the firm, and 0 otherwise. There are 1,130 top management turnovers in our sample, 
indicating a 26% annual turnover rate, which is slightly higher than the 24% turnover rate 
reported by Kato and Long (2006a). 
Firm profitability. We use ROA and EPS to measure firm profitability. ROA is a widely 
used measure of profitability in turnover studies (Huson et al., 2004). We calculate ROA as net 
income divided by total assets. EPS, defined as net income divided by the weighted average 
number of shares of common stocks outstanding, is one of the most important financial ratios 
used to evaluate firm performance. In China all listed firms must disclose their EPS to the public 
in their semi-annual and annual reports, required by the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC). CSRC also specifies a calculation formula to be followed by all the listed firms so that 
EPS represents a consistent measure of profitability comparable across firms. Because of the 
regulation and public attention, it is reasonable to treat EPS as an important criterion owners use 
to evaluate managerial performance in China
3
.    
To examine the impact of top management turnover on subsequent firm profitability, we 
calculate the change in firm profitability as the difference in ROA and EPS between the 
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following year (t+1) and the year (t) when top management turnover occurs. We also create a 
variable, change in industry profitability, calculated as the difference in industry ROA and EPS 
between year t+1 and year t to control for potentially confounding industry effects. Our use of 
the change in firm profitability to examine the impact of top management turnover is consistent 
with recent studies by Huson et al. (2004) and Kato and Long (2006b), and makes our findings 
comparable with theirs.   
State ownership and ownership structure-related control variables. The ownership 
structure of the listed firms in China can be classified into three primary groups: state shares, 
legal entity shares and public shares. State shares represent about 1/3 of the total shares and 
enable the government to continue to exert influence over the listed firms. Legal entity shares 
represent about 1/4 of the total shares. Like state shares, legal entity shares are not tradable and 
many of them are ultimately controlled by the state through its control over the legal entities 
(usually large SOEs). However, there exist important differences between state and legal entity 
shares, which have different implications for the relationship between firm profitability and top 
management turnover. Sun and Tong (2003) point out that many legal entities, unlike the state, 
have close business connections with the listed firms in which they have ownership. These legal 
entities thus benefit directly from the listed firms’ good performance and are hurt by their poor 
performance. Firth et al. (2006) also point out that legal entities, in contrast to the state, have 
profit objectives and receive dividends from their investments. They thus have incentive to 
pressure the firms to maximize profits. Compared with individual shareholders, legal entities are 
better equipped with the power to monitor and discipline managers through their influence over 
the boards of directors. Xu and Wang (1999) find that legal entity shares have a positive impact 
on firm performance in China.  
Public shares are tradable on the stock market and represent about 1/3 of the total shares. 
It is reasonable to believe that as the proportion of public shares increases, firms will be under 
more market pressure. However, because public shares are dispersed among millions of 
individual investors and China’s Company Law does not have a clear definition of minority 
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shareholders’ rights of proposition, owners of public shares are not able to protect their interests 
through shareholders’ general meetings (Zhang, 2004). Given the weak legal protection of 
minority shareholder interests, it is not clear what impact public shares would have on top 
management turnover. We thus include public ownership, calculated as the proportion of public 
shares, as a control variable in the analysis
4
. 
Some listed firms in China issue B-shares, which are traded in foreign currencies and are 
open to foreign investors. Bai et al. (2004) point out that firms that issue B-shares must adopt 
international accounting standards and have their financial statements audited by internationally 
recognized accounting firms. Compared with firms that only issue A-shares, these firms can be 
viewed as operating in a better developed market environment. A dummy variable of B-share is 
created to control for the effect of financial transparency and international auditing on firms 
issuing B-shares.  
Other control variables. We use two variables to control for the impact of top manager 
power on turnover. One is duality, measuring whether the top manager holds both the CEO and 
board chair positions. Holding both positions enables the top manager to not only exert control 
over board agendas and decisions (Weisbach, 1988), but also reduce the risk of power contest by 
a separate CEO or board chair (Shen and Cannella, 2002). The other is top manager tenure, 
measured by the number of years the top manager has been in office. Top managers with a short 
tenure tend to be less powerful and face a higher risk of turnover than top managers with a long 
tenure (Shen and Cannella, 2002). Stock ownership is another widely used measure of top 
manager power in studies of turnover (Finkelstein et al., in press). At the listed firms in China, 
however, the amount of executive stock ownership is trivial. In fact, employee ownership, which 
includes executive ownership, represent less than 0.01% of the total shares outstanding (Zhang, 
2004). Thus, we do not include top manager ownership in the analysis.  
We use three variables to control for the impact of the boards of director on top manager 
turnover. The first is board size, measured by the number of directors. Yermack (1996) argues 
that larger boards are less effective in monitoring management and are more susceptible to the 
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influence of the CEO. The second is the number of outside directors. Fama and Jensen (1983) 
argue that outside directors have an incentive to monitor management and to build their 
reputation as experts in decision control. Weisbach (1988) finds a stronger relationship between 
performance and CEO turnover when the boards are dominated by outside directors. The third is 
the frequency of board meetings. Boards that meet more frequently tend to devote more time to 
corporate governance (Chen et al., 2006)
5
.  
Top manager age, firm size (natural logarithm of the total assets), and industry, year and 
province dummies are also included in our analysis as control variables. Top manager age is used 
to control for turnover due to retirement. Firm size is included to control for any effect it may 
have on top management turnover. Industry and year dummies are used to control for differences 
between industries and over time with respect to the degree of privatization, stock market 
development and corporate governance. One special feature of China is the imbalanced regional 
development. Factors such as economic development, market competitiveness and legal 
environment can exert significant impacts on corporate governance quality. To address this issue, 
we use a set of province dummies to control for differences in regional development in the 
analysis. Table 1 provides summary statistics of our variables, except for the industry, year and 
province dummies. 
__________________________ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
__________________________   
Statistical Analysis 
Consistent with Firth et al. (2006) and Kato and Long (2006a), we use logit models to 
examine the impact of firm profitability and state ownership on top management turnover. In our 
logit models, the probability function of top management turnover can be expressed as 
Pr(turnover) = f (profitability, state ownership, control variables)       (1) 
Because f (.) = exp (.) / {1 + exp (.)}, using X to denote the vector of predictors and B to denote 
the vector of coefficients, the probability function of top management turnover can be expressed 
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as 
Pr(turnover) = exp(XB)/{1+exp(XB)          (2) 
The odds of turnover, defined as the ratio of the probability of turnover to the probability of no 
turnover, thus is 
Odds = Pr(turnover)/{1-Pr(turnover)} = exp(XB)                (3)                                          
Equation (3) shows that the odds of turnover increases as the probability of turnover increases. 
When Pr(turnover)<.5, the odds of turnover is less than one; when Pr(turnover)=.5, the odds of 
turnover equals one; and when Pr(turnover)>.5, the odds of turnover is greater than one. Taking 
the natural logarithm on both sides of equation (3), we get the logit transform of the probability 
of top management turnover 
Logit(Pr(turnover)) = ln(odds) = BX          (4) 
Equation (4) shows that the coefficients B in a logit model can be interpreted in the same way as 
in a regular OLS regression. A significant, positive coefficient b1 for variable x1 means that a unit 
increase in x1 results in an increase in the logarithm of the odds of turnover by b1, suggesting that 
x1 has a positive impact on turnover. In contrast, if b1 is negative, it means that a unit increase in 
x1 results in a decrease in the logarithm of the odds of turnover by b1, suggesting that x1 has a 
negative impact on turnover.  
We first run the analysis using the full sample. We then split the sample on the basis of 
whether firm profitability is above or below the industry median, and run the analysis separately 
using the split samples. Because we have an unbalanced panel data, we cluster the observations 
at the firm-level and use robust standard errors in the analysis.  
In the analysis of the impact of top management turnover on subsequent firm profitability, 
because we have a rather short panel and some of the variables such state share and public share 
are relatively stable, it is not appropriate to use fixed-effects models. We decide to cluster the 
observations at the firm level and conduct the analysis using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression.  
Three of our hypotheses (H1b, H2b, and H4b) are null hypotheses, predicting no 
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relationship between the variables of interest. Cohen (1988) suggests that a null hypothesis can 
be accepted when the relationship between two variables is found to be trivial. Later, Cohen 
(1990: 1307-1309) defines “trivial” as when the sample size used on a statistical test is sufficient 
for the risk of Type II error (β) to be equal to the commonly accepted risk of Type I error (α) of 
0.05. A power analysis can be used to determine the sample size needed to detect a nontrivial 
effect at α = 0.05 and a power of 0.95 (that is, β = 0.05). When the sample size is large enough to 
have a power of 0.95 and the results of the statistical test is not significant, then the null 
hypothesis can be accepted as being supported. That is, “the conclusion is justified that no 
nontrivial effects exist, at the β = 0.05 level” (Cohen, 1990: 1309). For a conservative t-test of 
the null hypothesis (small effect size of r
2
 = 0.01 and α = β = 0.05), the number of observations 
needed is 1308 (Cohen et al., 2003: 654). Our sample size is large enough to meet this 
requirement.  
RESULTS 
Table 2 reports the results of logit regression analysis of top management turnover at the 
listed firms in China. Firm profitability is measured by ROA in models 1 to 3, and by EPS in 
models 4 to 6. Model 1 shows that the coefficients for both ROA (b=-3.46, p<.001) and state 
ownership (b=-0.44, p<.05) are negative and statistically significant when the full sample is used 
in the analysis. However, after we split the sample using industry median ROA, the results show 
that the coefficients for ROA and state ownership are only significant for the sub-sample in 
which firm ROA is below industry median (Model 3: b=-2.27, p<.01 for ROA; b=-0.93, p<.001 
for state ownership), but not significant for the sub-sample in which firm ROA is above industry 
median (Model 2: b=-0.87, p=.73 for ROA; b=-0.04, p=.87 for state ownership).  
__________________________ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
__________________________   
When EPS is used as the measure of firm profitability, the results show a similar pattern. 
Model 4 shows that the coefficients for EPS (b=-0.88, p<.001) and state ownership (b=-0.44, 
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p<.05) are negative and statistically significant in the full sample analysis. After we split the 
sample using industry median EPS, they are only significant for the sub-sample in which firm 
EPS is below industry median (Model 6: b=-0.52, p<.05 for EPS; b=-1.02, p<.001 for state 
ownership), but not for the sub-sample in which firm EPS is above industry median (Model 5: 
b=-0.53, p=.23 for EPS; b=-0.08, p=.78 for state ownership). These results support our 
hypotheses that firm profitability is negatively related to top management turnover when it is 
below target (H1a), but is not related to top management turnover when it is above target (H1b); 
and that state ownership is negatively related to top management turnover when firm profitability 
is below target (H2a), but is not related to top management turnover when firm profitability is 
above target (H2b). 
Among the control variables, duality and firm size are negatively related to turnover; 
board meeting frequency and age are positively related to turnover; B-share is positively related 
to turnover when performance is below industry median; and public ownership is positively 
related to turnover when performance is above industry median. 
Table 3 reports the results of OLS regression analysis of change in firm profitability 
following top management turnover. Models 1 and 2 examine change in ROA, and models 3 and 
4 examine change in EPS. The results show that the coefficients for top management turnover 
under performance below target are positive and statistically significant in Model 1, panel A 
(b=0.01, p<.1) and Model 1, panel B (b=0.06, p<.01), and the coefficients for top management 
turnover under performance above target are negative and statistically significant in Model 1, 
panel A (b=-0.02, p<.001). These findings support our hypotheses that top management turnover 
has a positive impact on subsequent firm profitability when it occurs under performance below 
target (H3a), but has a negative impact on firm profitability when it occurs under performance 
above target (H3b).  
__________________________ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
__________________________   
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After we further refine top management turnover under performance below target on the 
basis of whether the state is the largest shareholder, we find that the positive coefficients for top 
management turnover under performance below target are only significant when the state is not 
the largest shareholder, (b=0.02, p<.05 in Model 2, panel A; b=0.06, p<.05 in Model 2, panel B), 
but not significant when the state is the largest shareholder (b=0.00, p=.94 in Model 2, panel A; 
b=0.05, p=.23 in Model 2, panel B). These results support our hypotheses that when firm 
profitability is below target, top management turnover has a positive impact on subsequent firm 
profitability if the state is not the largest shareholder (H4a), but has no impact if the state is the 
largest shareholder (H4b). In comparison, we find that the coefficients for top management 
turnover under performance above target are negative and significant for change in firm ROA, 
regardless whether the state is the largest shareholder (Model 2, panel A: b=-0.01, p<.05 when 
the state is the largest shareholder; b=-0.02, p<.001 when the state is not the largest shareholder).  
Among the control variables, change in industry profitability shows a consistent positive 
impact, and public ownership shows a consistent negative impact on change in firm profitability 
in all the models in Table 3. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
The purpose of this study is to clarify the relationship between firm profitability and top 
management turnover, as well as the impact of state ownership on it, at the listed firms in China. 
One explanation for the positive impact of privatization on firm profitability is that privatization 
improves corporate governance quality by making managers more accountable for firm financial 
performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Megginson, 2005). However, recent studies of the listed 
firms in China do not find convincing evidence that state ownership weakens the negative 
relationship between firm profitability and top management turnover, or that top management 
turnover has a positive impact on subsequent financial performance (Firth et al., 2006; Kato and 
Long, 2006a, 2006b). These findings cast doubts on the argument that privatization improves 
corporate governance quality in China. 
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We argue that the lack of strong support for the argument that privatization makes 
managers more accountable for financial performance can be attributable to the difficulty in 
identifying forced top management turnover in China. Building on the behavioral theory of 
organizational search (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963), we propose that top 
management turnover reflects the outcome of corporate governance only when firm performance 
misses target, but not when firm performance meets target. Empirically, we find that firm 
profitability is negatively related to top management turnover when it is below target (measured 
by industry median), but is not related to top management turnover when it is above target. These 
findings provide strong support for our proposition.  
Moreover, we find that top management turnover has a positive impact on firm ROA and 
EPS when it occurs under performance below target, but has a negative impact when it occurs 
under performance above target. This finding has two implications. First, it highlights the 
importance of distinguishing top management turnovers occurred under performance below 
target from those occurred under performance above target in studying the impact of 
privatization on corporate governance quality in transition economies such as China. The reason 
is that they have opposite effects on firm performance and only the former represent the outcome 
of corporate governance. This finding can explain why Firth et al. (2006) and Kato and Long 
(2006b) find little evidence that top management turnover has a positive impact on firm 
performance, because they use all top management turnover in the analysis. Second, the above 
finding suggests that corporate governance is effective at the listed firms in China because top 
management turnover under performance below target does have a positive impact on 
subsequent firm profitability.   
Regarding the role of state ownership in corporate governance, we find evidence that it 
reduces top management turnover when firm profitability is below target. This finding suggests 
that state ownership weakens the sensitivity of top management turnover to firm profitability. 
Moreover, we find that performance-related top management turnover has a positive impact on 
subsequent firm profitability only when the state is not the largest shareholder. When the state is 
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the largest shareholder, it has no impact on subsequent firm profitability. These findings provide 
direct support for the argument that state ownership weakens corporate governance quality at 
partially privatized firms (Sun and Tong, 2003; Gupta, 2005).  
Our control variables also generate some interesting findings. Public ownership shows a 
positive impact on top management turnover when profitability is above industry median, and a 
negative impact on subsequent firm profitability. These findings suggest that firms with a higher 
level of public ownership tend to experience more turnover unrelated to poor performance. 
Moreover, we find no evidence that public ownership in China increases top management 
turnover when profitability is below industry median. A possible explanation is that the diffusion 
of public ownership among individual investors makes it less effective in corporate governance 
(Zhang, 2004). B-share and board meeting frequency show a positive impact on top management 
turnover when profitability is below industry median, suggesting that firms that issue B-shares 
and have more frequent board meetings tend to hold top managers more accountable for firm 
financial performance. Lastly, consistent with research in the U.S. (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; Shen 
and Cannella, 2002), we find that duality and firm size have a negative impact, and age has a 
positive impact on top management turnover in China.  
Limitations 
Although our study helps clarify the relationships between firm profitability, state 
ownership, and top management turnover in China, its findings should be interpreted in light of 
its limitations. One limitation is concerned with treatment of all the other firms in the same 
industry as the focal firm’s peers and the use of industry median profitability as the focal firm’s 
performance target. Although this practice is widely adopted in research on the behavioral theory 
of organizational search (Greve, 2003b), we encourage researchers to survey top managers 
directly about their performance target. Another limitation is concerned with the use of a 
one-year lag in assessing the impact of top management turnover on subsequent firm profitability. 
Because China’s fast economic growth and high rate of top management turnover, we feel that 
our choice is reasonable and justified. However, it is important to validate the robustness of our 
 24 
findings using a longer lag such as two or three years.  
Implications for Future Research and Practice 
Despite the above limitations, our study has important implications for future research 
and practice. First, it has implications for research on top management turnover in other 
emerging economies. One main challenge for studying top management turnover in emerging 
economies is the difficulty to identify forced turnover because of the lack of information (Gibson, 
2003). However, to examine the quality of corporate governance, both our study and prior 
research (e.g., Huson et al., 2004) show that it is important to analyze forced turnovers only, 
especially when the interest is to understand the impact of top management turnover on firm 
performance. The behavioral theory of organizational search (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and 
March, 1963) proves to be useful in our study in helping separate top management turnovers 
caused by performance from those unrelated to performance. Future research can examine 
whether this approach can also enhance the understanding of top management turnover in other 
emerging economies.     
Second, regarding future study on top management turnover in China, we suggest 
researchers to focus on two related issues. One is about the frequency of top management 
turnover. Consistent with recent research (e.g., Firth et al., 2006; Kato and Long, 2006a), our 
study shows a high rate (about 26%) of top management turnover at the listed firms in China. 
The average tenure of the departed top managers in our sample is only about four years. Prior 
research suggests that frequent top management turnover can have a negative impact on strategy 
and performance at U.S. companies (Finkelstein et al., in press). It will be interesting and 
important to investigate whether top management turnover frequency has a similar impact on 
Chinese companies. The other is to focus on top management turnover unrelated to firm 
performance. Our study shows that a significant number of top management turnover in China 
occur when performance is above industry median (see Table 2 for the numbers of turnover in 
the split samples) and have a negative impact on subsequent firm profitability. We believe that it 
is important for future research to investigate (1) what factors cause these turnovers and (2) what 
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actions firms can take to reduce their negative effect on subsequent performance.  
Lastly, our study has some important implications for policy and managerial practice. 
Our findings clearly show that state ownership at the listed firms in China weakens the 
relationship between firm profitability and top management turnover. Together with recent 
studies (e.g., Sun and Tong, 2003; Wei et al., 2005) that report a negative impact of state 
ownership on firm financial performance, our study suggests that the Chinese government should 
continue to dilute its ownership in the listed firms to further improve their economic performance. 
In addition, because top management turnover has a negative impact on subsequent firm 
profitability when it occurs under performance above industry median, we suggest that firms 
strive to prevent this type of turnover. If the turnover is inevitable, firms should have a 
succession plan in place so that its negative impact on performance can be reduced.  
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NOTES 
1. For U.S. corporations, the annul CEO turnover rate is about 12%, and the average age for 
outgoing CEOs is about 62 years old (Huson et al., 2004). 
2. We also tried to classify top management turnover in our sample into “forced” and 
“normal” on the basis of the reasons given by the firms, and obtained similar results. 
Namely, we find that firm profitability has a negative impact on both what we classified 
as “forced turnover” and “normal turnover”. 
3. We do not use stock market based performance measures for two reasons. First, because 
the majority of shares held by the state and legal entities are not publicly tradable, we 
believe that firm profitability is more important than stock return in evaluating 
managerial performance. Second, Morck et al. (2000) find that more than 80% of the 
stocks in China move in the same direction in a given week, suggesting that stock return 
is less informative of firm performance in China than in developed economies. In 
separate analysis using stock return as a performance measure, we find that it has no 
impact on top management turnover. 
4. Because having state ownership, legal entity ownership and public ownership 
simultaneously in the analysis leads to the problem of multicollinearity, we treat legal 
entity ownership as the benchmark group in our models. 
5. There is also a board of supervisors in China. The duty of the supervisory board is to 
ensure that the board of directors and management abide by laws and regulations and 
follow due procedures. However, the supervisory board is only equipped with the right of 
monitoring and supervision, without the right to select managers and directors or to veto 
the decisions of management and the board. Moreover, members of the supervisory board 
are determined by the board of directors (Zhang, 2004). The board of supervisors has 
been described as more “decorative” than functional (Tenev and Zhang 2002). In 
additional analysis, we find that the results are essentially the same with or without the 
inclusion of the supervisory board (its size and meeting frequency) as control variables. 
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TABLE 1  
Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
 
  
Variables No. of obs. Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Turnover 4302 0.26 0 0.42 
ROA 4279 0.02 0.04 0.12 
EPS 4285 0.14 0.19 0.40 
State ownership 4278 0.32 0.32 0.27 
Legal entity ownership 4278 0.27 0.20 0.26 
Public ownership 4258 0.35 0.34 0.13 
B-share 4286 0.08 0 0.27 
Duality 4278 0.19 0 0.39 
Tenure 4286 2.72 2 1.90 
Age 3047 47.64 47 7.41 
Board size 4264 9.63 9 2.52 
Outside directors 4271 0.82 0 1.18 
Board meeting frequency 4318 6.38 6 3.18 
Firm size 4286 20.92 20.85 0.87 
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TABLE 2  
Logit Regression Analysis of Top Management Turnover in China 
 
Panel A: Profitability measured by ROA 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Full Sample 
Firm Performance 
Above Industry 
Median 
Firm Performance 
Below Industry 
Median 
ROA -3.46 -0.87 -2.27 
 [0.76]*** [2.54] [0.78]*** 
State Share -0.44 -0.04 -0.93 
 [0.18]** [0.26] [0.27]*** 
Public Share 0.71 1.97 -0.64 
 [0.43]* [0.62]*** [0.63] 
B-Share 0.52 0.02 0.63 
 [0.21]** [0.35] [0.29]** 
Duality -1.03 -1.2 -0.91 
 [0.14]*** [0.21]*** [0.18]*** 
Tenure -0.00 0.05 -0.03 
 [0.03] [0.04] [0.03] 
Board Size -0.00 -0.01 0.01 
 [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] 
Outside Director 0.09 0.04 0.17 
 [0.06] [0.09] [0.10]* 
Board Meeting Frequency 0.21 0.21 0.22 
 [0.02]*** [0.03]*** [0.03]*** 
CEO Age 0.03 0.04 0.03 
 [0.01]*** [0.01]*** [0.01]*** 
Firm Size -0.17 -0.22 -0.18 
 [0.07]*** [0.10]** [0.09]* 
Constant -0.56 -1.00 0.11 
 [1.42] [2.08] [2.01] 
Pseudo R-saure 0.13 0.16 0.14 
Observations 3006 1511 1495 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The standard errors (in parentheses) are 
estimated using robust standard errors (clustered by firm) that account for potential heteroskedasticity and time 
series autocorrelation within each firm. 
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Panel B: Profitability measured by EPS 
 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Full Sample 
Firm Performance 
Above Industry 
Median 
Firm Performance 
Below Industry 
Median 
EPS -0.88 -0.53 -0.52 
 [0.21]*** [0.45] [0.22]** 
State Share -0.44 -0.07 -1.02 
 [0.18]** [0.26] [0.26]*** 
Public Share 0.79 2.09 -0.46 
 [0.43]* [0.61]*** [0.62] 
B-Share 0.54 0.07 0.78 
 [0.21]** [0.34] [0.28]*** 
Duality -1.02 -1.10 -0.94 
 [0.14]*** [0.21]*** [0.19]*** 
Tenure -0.01 0.02 -0.02 
 [0.03] [0.04] [0.03] 
Board Size -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
 [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] 
Outside Director 0.09 0.05 0.21 
 [0.06] [0.09] [0.10]** 
Board Meeting Frequency 0.21 0.23 0.2 
 [0.02]*** [0.03]*** [0.03]*** 
CEO Age 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 [0.01]*** [0.01]*** [0.01]*** 
Firm Size -0.14 0.01 -0.24 
 [0.07]** [0.10] [0.09]*** 
Constant -1.09 -5.45 1.88 
 [1.46] [2.16]** [2.09] 
Pseudo R-saure 0.13 0.12 0.15 
Observations 3013 1533 1480 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The standard errors (in parentheses) are 
estimated using robust standard errors (clustered by firm) that account for potential heteroskedasticity and time 
series autocorrelation within each firm.
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TABLE 3  
Regression Analysis of Change in Firm Profitability Following Top Management Turnover 
Panel A: Change in ROA 
  (1) (2) 
  Change in Performance Change in Performance 
Turnover under performance below industry median 0.01  
 [0.01]*  
When state is the largest shareholder  0.00 
  [0.01] 
When state is not the largest shareholder  0.02 
  [0.01]** 
Turnover under performance above industry median -0.02  
 [0.00]***  
When state is the largest shareholder  -0.01 
  [0.01]** 
When state is not the largest shareholder  -0.02 
  [0.00]*** 
Change in industry profitability 1.00 1.00 
 [0.25]*** [0.25]*** 
State Ownership 0.00 0.00 
 [0.00] [0.00] 
Public Ownership -0.04 -0.04 
 [0.01]*** [0.01]*** 
B-share 0.00 0.00 
 [0.00] [0.00] 
Duality -0.00 -0.00 
 [0.00] [0.00] 
Board Size 0.00 0.00 
 [0.00] [0.00] 
Outside Director 0.00 0.00 
 [0.00] [0.00] 
Board Meeting Frequency 0.00 0.00 
 [0.00] [0.00] 
Firm Size -0.00 -0.00 
 [0.00] [0.00] 
Constant 0.02 0.02 
 [0.03] [0.03] 
Observations 3845 3845 
R-squared 0.11 0.11 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The standard errors (in parentheses) are 
estimated using robust standard errors (clustered by firm) that account for potential heteroskedasticity and time 
series autocorrelation within each firm.
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TABLE 3 Continued 
Panel B: Change in EPS 
  (1) (2) 
  Change in Performance Change in Performance 
Turnover under performance below industry median 0.06  
 [0.02]***  
When state is the largest shareholder  0.05 
  [0.04] 
When state is not the largest shareholder  0.06 
  [0.02]** 
Turnover under performance above industry median -0.02  
 [0.02]  
When state is the largest shareholder  -0.04 
  [0.03] 
When state is not the largest shareholder  -0.02 
  [0.02] 
Change in industry profitability 1.00 1.00 
 [0.27]*** [0.27]*** 
State Ownership -0.01 -0.01 
 [0.02] [0.02] 
Public Ownership -0.15 -0.15 
 [0.04]*** [0.04]*** 
B-share -0.01 -0.01 
 [0.02] [0.02] 
Duality 0.02 0.02 
 [0.02] [0.02] 
Board Size 0.00 0.00 
 [0.00] [0.00] 
Outside Director -0.01 -0.01 
 [0.01] [0.01] 
Board Meeting Frequency 0.00 0.00 
 [0.00] [0.00] 
Firm Size 0.00 0.00 
 [0.01] [0.01] 
Constant 0.06 0.06 
 [0.17] [0.17] 
Observations 3859 3859 
R-squared 0.14 0.14 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The standard errors (in parentheses) are 
estimated using robust standard errors (clustered by firm) that account for potential heteroskedasticity and time 
series autocorrelation within each firm.
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FIGURE 1 
Hypothesized Relationships between Firm Profitability, State Ownership, and 
Top Management Turnover 
 
A: When firm profitability is below the industry median 
 
 
 
 
  B:  When firm profitability is above the industry median 
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